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TEARIN’ UP IHEART:  THE RECENT TREND WITH 
TROUBLED COMPANIES AND THE UNRESTRICTED 
SUBSIDIARY TRANSFER TACTIC  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Controlling shareholders (“controllers”1) of various struggling 
companies have recently inspired news stories by using an innovative 
strategy called “The Unrestricted Subsidiary Transfer Tactic.”2  The Un-
restricted Subsidiary Transfer Tactic involves controller use of unre-
stricted subsidiaries to skirt loan covenant restrictions. 3  Complaints filed 
by lenders and minority shareholders demonstrate the concerns that this 
tactic generates.4  The cases centered on the use of The Unrestricted Sub-
sidiary Transfer Tactic by iHeartMedia, Inc. (“iHeart”) have been re-
solved in iHeart’s favor thanks to established case law surrounding loan 
covenant review and the fiduciary duties of controllers to minority share-
holders.5  However, one recent Delaware Supreme Court case reaffirmed 
certain internal measures which could protect parent corporations that 
wish to draw resources from their unrestricted subsidiaries from liability.6   
 
 1. Flood v. Synutra Int’l, Inc., 195 A.3d 754, 756 (Del. 2018) (using the term “control-
ler” pervasively in reference to the controlling shareholder); JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE 
HAZEN, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS LAW § 11.11, at 271 (4th ed. 2016) (describing a controller, 
or controlling stockholder, as a “person [or organization which] owns a majority of the voting 
shares” of a corporation).  
 2. Emma Orr, Retail’s Creditors Left Grasping as Brands Are Put out of Reach, 
CHICAGO TRIB. (Feb. 23, 2017, 9:04 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-retail-
creditors-owners-20170223-story.html (summarizing use of unrestricted subsidiaries in J. 
Crew and Claire’s transactions). 
 3. Franklin Advisers, Inc. v. iHeart Commc’ns Inc., No. 04-16-00532-CV, 2017 WL 
4518297 (Tex. App. Oct. 11, 2017) (displaying aggrieved lender iHeart case this note ana-
lyzes); Gamco Asset Mgmt. Inc. v. iHeartMedia Inc., No. 12312, 2016 WL 6892802 (Del. 
Ch. Nov. 23, 2016, revised Nov. 29, 2016) (displaying aggrieved minority shareholder iHeart 
case this note analyzes), aff’d, No. 593, 2017 WL 4607413 (Del. Oct. 12, 2017); Orr, supra 
note 2 (summarizing use of unrestricted subsidiaries in J. Crew and Claire’s transactions). 
 4. Franklin Advisers, Inc., 2017 WL 4518297; Gamco Asset Mgmt. Inc., 2016 WL 
6892802; Orr, supra note 2. 
 5. Gamco Asset Mgmt. Inc., 2016 WL 6892802 (“[iHeart] is a Delaware corporation 
engaged in the mass media industry. Through its subsidiaries, iHM owns and operates more 
than 850 radio stations throughout the United States, making it the largest owner and operator 
of radio stations in the nation.”); see infra Parts II-III. 
 6. See Flood, 195 A.3d at 756 (proposing “approval by an independent Special Com-
mittee and an affirmative vote by a majority of the minority stockholders” as such a curative 
means). 
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This Note discusses the reasons why the iHeart cases were cor-
rectly decided and what these decisions mean for The Unrestricted Sub-
sidiary Transfer Tactic moving forward.7  Part II explains The Unre-
stricted Subsidiary Transfer Tactic and then summarizes the iHeart cases 
as a collective example of a transfer of assets by a controller, iHeart’s 
subsidiary iHeartCommunications (“iHC”), from restricted subsidiary 
Clear Channel Outdoor Holdings (“CCOH”) to unrestricted subsidiary 
Broader Media.8  Part III delves into the legal concepts involved in The 
Unrestricted Subsidiary Transfer Tactic and why those concepts demon-
strate that the iHeart cases were decided correctly.9  Part IV describes the 
proposed curative methods based upon the iHeart decisions and then re-
views more recent and ongoing lawsuits filed because of controller use 
of The Unrestricted Subsidiary Transfer Tactic.10  Part V then concludes 
the Note.11 
II. UNRESTRICTED SUBSIDIARIES AND IHEART’S CRITICAL CONDITION 
A .        Overview of Unrestricted Subsidiaries as a Parent Debtor’s  
Tactic 
Certain companies have found themselves in positions where 
they are unlikely to meet the obligations under their lending covenants.12  
These troubled companies stand to lose assets that are either held by the 
companies themselves or that are held by their subsidiaries as pursuant to 
their loan obligations.13  As is standard practice, these loan packages re-
quire that the borrowing company, and any of its subsidiaries, restrict 
certain actions as outlined in finance documents or agreements.14  
 
 7. See infra Parts II–IV.  
 8. Franklin Advisers, Inc., 2017 WL 4518297; Gamco Asset Mgmt. Inc., 2016 WL 
6892802; see infra Part II. 
 9. See infra Part III. 
 10. See Flood, 195 A.3d at 756 (proposing “approval by an independent Special Com-
mittee and an affirmative vote by a majority of the minority stockholders” as such a curative 
means); see also infra Part IV. 
 11. See infra Part V. 
 12. Orr, supra note 2 (furnishing J. Crew Group Inc. and Claire’s Stores Inc. as two ex-
amples). 
 13. Orr, supra note 2 (providing intellectual property like a recognizable company name 
as one such asset). 
 14. COLIN CHANG ET AL., WHITE & CASE LLP, CLIENT ALERT:  THINKING OUTSIDE THE 
BOX: THE BASICS OF UNRESTRICTED SUBSIDIARIES (June 2, 2017), https://www.white-
case.com/publications/alert/thinking-outside-box-basics-unrestricted-subsidiaries (“A typical 
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Restricted activities can include incurring additional debts, selling assets, 
and paying dividends.15  The borrowing company and its subsidiaries that 
are subject to these restrictions are defined collectively as the “restricted 
group.”16  Subsidiaries become part of the restricted group unless they 
have been designated by the borrower as “unrestricted subsidiaries.”17  
Unrestricted subsidiaries can protect assets such as money18 or intellec-
tual property19 from seizure in the event the borrower cannot pay back 
the loan because assets within an unrestricted subsidiary are not subject 
to the respective loan agreements.20  Borrowers make such designations 
because unrestricted subsidiaries do not have to adhere to loan covenant 
restrictions.21  However, this designation turns the unrestricted subsidiary 
into something of a third party which cannot flexibly engage in inter-
 
covenant package will limit a corporate group from taking certain actions by applying re-
strictions to a designated entity . . . and its ‘Restricted Subsidiaries.’”). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Maura O’Sullivan & Benjamin Cheng, Term Loans and High Yield Bonds: Tracking 
the Convergence, Practical Law Article 5-520-2458 (differentiating between restricted and 
unrestricted subsidiaries in the context of loan agreements); see also MICHAEL FRIEDMAN ET 
AL., CHAPMAN AND CUTLER LLP, CLIENT ALERT: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT 
UNRESTRICTED SUBSIDIARIES (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.chapman.com/insights-publica-
tions-Restructure_Covenants_Capital_Structure.html.  Friedman describes the circumstances 
under which subsidiaries may be designates as unrestricted:  
 
Financing agreements will typically permit the company to designate a 
subsidiary as an “unrestricted subsidiary” if certain conditions are satis-
fied.  Such conditions may include:  (1) that such subsidiary at the time 
of determination would not hold liens on, indebtedness of, or equity in-
terests in its parent company or a restricted subsidiary; (2) that the com-
pany is permitted by the financing agreement covenants to make an in-
vestment in the unrestricted subsidiary in an amount equal to, or greater 
than, the fair market value of such unrestricted subsidiary; (3) that the 
company and its restricted subsidiaries are not responsible for any debt 
incurred by such unrestricted subsidiary; and/or (4) that the debt incur-
rence test (contained in the restrictions on indebtedness covenant) must 
be satisfied at the time of, and after giving effect to, the designation of 
such unrestricted subsidiary. 
 
Id. 
 18. Gamco Asset Mgmt. Inc. v. iHeartMedia Inc., No. 12312, 2016 WL 6892802, at *7 
(Del. Ch. Nov. 23, 2016, revised Nov. 29, 2016) (describing the process by which money 
assets were protected using The Unrestricted Subsidiary Transfer Tactic), aff’d, No. 593, 2017 
WL 4607413 (Del. Oct. 12, 2017). 
 19. Orr, supra note 2 (providing that intellectual property, like a recognizable company 
name, is an asset that can be protected using the unrestricted subsidiary tactic). 
 20. FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 17. 
 21. O’Sullivan & Cheng, supra note 17. 
274 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 23 
affiliate transactions with restricted group members as restricted group 
members can with one another.22   
Distressed companies, such as iHeart, have used The Unrestricted 
Subsidiary Transfer Tactic to alleviate their debt pressures.23  In fact, par-
ent companies have gone so far as to create unrestricted subsidiaries for 
the purpose of receiving assets from a restricted subsidiary.24  The parent 
can then use the assets transferred to the unrestricted subsidiary as collat-
eral to back new debts that are then used to pay back the original debt.25   
Investors have been frustrated by the use of unrestricted subsidi-
aries to skirt obligations to creditors.26  To investor-creditors, the unre-
stricted subsidiary tactic constitutes an event of default.27  Despite these 
 
 22. CHANG, supra note 14 (“[T]here are several advantages to being in the Restricted 
Group, which are often overlooked.  This includes unlimited transfers of assets, intra-group 
loans and capital contributions/investments as well as all actions permitted under the Affiliate 
Transactions and other relevant covenants.”). 
 23. See Orr, supra note 2 (summarizing use of unrestricted subsidiaries in J. Crew and 
Claire’s transactions). 
 24. Second Amended Counterclaims at 4, 20, Argos Holdings, Inc. v. Wilmington Tr., 
N.A., No. 1:18-cv-05773 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 15, 2018) (stating that PetSmart created unre-
stricted subsidiary Buddy Chester Corp, which is 100% privately owned by PetSmart, to re-
ceive equity assets from restricted subsidiary Chewy.com); Eliza Ronalds-Hannon & Kathe-
rine Doherty, PetSmart Moves Part of Chewy.com out of Creditors’ Reach, BLOOMBERG (June 
4, 2018, 6:31 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-04/petsmart-is-said-
to-move-chewy-stake-in-j-crew-style-transfer (stating PetSmart’s transfer “mimics asset 
transfers initiated by other distressed retailers, especially those owned by private equity spon-
sors,” and then noting that “J. Crew Group Inc. and Claire’s Stores Inc. have created subsidi-
aries to hold assets including intellectual property, insulating them from creditors while free-
ing them up for use as collateral to back new debts”).  But see Gamco Asset Mgmt. Inc. v. 
iHeartMedia Inc., No. 12312, 2016 WL 6892802, at *7 (Del. Ch. Nov. 23, 2016, revised Nov. 
29, 2016) (describing the iHeart unrestricted subsidiary transfer that took place December, 
2015), aff’d, No. 593, 2017 WL 4607413 (Del. Oct. 12, 2017); Broader Media, LLC: Private 
Company Information, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 27, 2018, 5:40 PM), https://www.bloom-
berg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=319095502 (providing that iHeart 
unrestricted subsidiary Broader Media was founded in 2009). 
 25. FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 17 (“[I]n some cases, the parent of the unrestricted sub-
sidiary is free to grant liens to third parties on the stock of the unrestricted subsidiary.”); Jodi 
Xu Klein, Distressed Retailers Scour Loan Fine Print for Debt Tactics, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 
20, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-12-20/distressed-retailers-scour-
loan-fine-print-for-debt-strategies (describing J. Crew’s use of The Unrestricted Subsidiary 
Transfer Tactic “to shift its brand name . . . to an unrestricted entity in the Cayman Islands” 
to allow the company “to borrow against the assets and use the proceeds to buy back a portion 
of its roughly $2 billion in debt at a discount”). 
 26. Second Amended Counterclaims at 3, Argos Holdings, Inc. v. Wilmington Tr., N.A., 
No. 1:18-cv-05773 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 15, 2018) (providing investor description of the 
PetSmart unrestricted subsidiary transfer as “a corporate shell game designed to impair 
PetSmart’s existing creditors”); FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 17 (describing agitation felt by 
investors in the iHeart and J. Crew cases which led to litigation). 
 27. FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 17 (referencing default notices sent by investors in the 
iHeart and J. Crew cases after the transfers to unrestricted subsidiaries). 
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sentiments, courts have recently upheld uses of unrestricted subsidiaries 
by well-known companies J. Crew Group, Inc. (“J. Crew”) and iHeart.28  
Because the J. Crew actions were resolved by a settlement made between 
J. Crew and its lender,29 only “the iHeart actions”30 offer an opportunity 
to examine why the current legal environment surrounding unrestricted 
subsidiary transfers needs revision.31   
B.       Case History on the iHeart Actions 
The iHeart actions involved parent company iHeart, subsidiary 
iHeartCommunications (“iHC”),32 iHC restricted subsidiary Clear Chan-
nel Holdings (“CC Holdings”),33 CC Holdings publicly-traded restricted 
subsidiary Clear Channel Outdoor Holdings (“CCOH”),34 and iHC 
 
 28. Franklin Advisers, Inc. v. iHeart Commc’ns Inc., No. 04-16-00532-CV, 2017 WL 
4518297, at *4 (Tex. App. Oct. 11, 2017) (holding that use of Unrestricted Subsidiary Trans-
fer Tactic was not violative of lending agreement); Eaton Vance Mgmt. v. Wilmington Sav. 
Fund Soc., FSB, No. 654397, 2018 WL 1947405, at *10-11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 25, 2018) 
(holding that no-action clause of lending agreement between J. Crew and WSFS barred Eaton 
Vance creditors from bringing fraud suit against J. Crew for transfer of assets to unrestricted 
subsidiary, as the J. Crew v. WSFS action was discontinued); Gamco Asset Mgmt. Inc., 2016 
WL 6892802 (holding the facts alleged by plaintiff in derivative suit flowing from iHeart asset 
transfer failed to sufficiently rebut the presumption under the business judgment rule that 
iHeartMedia transferred assets to unrestricted subsidiary CCOH in good faith such that de-
fendant’s motion to dismiss was granted). 
 29. Eaton Vance Mgmt., 2018 WL 1947405, at *10-11 (holding that a settlement between 
J. Crew and a majority meant minority owner plaintiffs could not bring suit against J. Crew 
for asset transfer to unrestricted subsidiary due to no-action clause, which only allowed such 
actions to be brought by a majority of shareholders). 
 30. Note refers to both Franklin Advisers, Inc., 2017 WL 4518297 and Gamco Asset 
Mgmt. Inc., 2016 WL 6892802 collectively as “the iHeart actions.” 
 31. Franklin Advisers, Inc., 2017 WL 4518297, at *4 (concluding iHeart unrestricted 
subsidiary transfer to be a permissible investment); Gamco Asset Mgmt. Inc., 2016 WL 
6892802, at *16-19 (concluding iHeart unrestricted subsidiary transfer not to be a conflicted 
transaction).   
 32. Gamco Asset Mgmt. Inc., 2016 WL 6892802, at *3 (“iHC, formerly known as Clear 
Channel Communications, Inc., is a Texas corporation and an indirect wholly owned subsid-
iary of iHM.”). 
 33. Franklin Advisers, Inc., 2017 WL 4518297, at *3 (acting as restricted subsidiary of 
iHC and as both controller and parent company of CCOH); Clear Channel Holdings Inc, 
BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/profiles/companies/1804881Z:US-clear-channel-
holdings-inc (last visited Feb. 9, 2019) (stating that CC Holdings is privately owned). 
 34. Gamco Asset Mgmt. Inc., 2016 WL 6892802, at *3 (“CCOH is a Delaware corpora-
tion.  It is among the largest providers of outdoor or ‘out-of home’ advertising in the United 
States and throughout the world.  It owns and operates more than 650,000 outdoor advertising 
displays worldwide . . . .”); Clear Channel Outdoor Holdings Inc., Registration Statement Un-
der the Securities Act of 1933 (Form S-1) (Nov. 9, 2005) (detailing the CCOH initial public 
offering). 
276 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 23 
unrestricted subsidiary Broader Media.35  Two cases comprise the iHeart 
actions, each of which centers upon iHC using its controlling interest of 
CCOH to transfer assets from CCOH to unrestricted subsidiary Broader 
Media.36  In the first case, iHC filed suit against investment fund man-
agement firms and iHC debt holders Franklin Advisers Inc., Oz Manage-
ment LP, Oz Management II LP, and Benefit Street Partners LLC 
(“Franklin and Oz”).37  This suit stemmed from a transfer of CCOH assets 
to Broader Media.38  In the second case, CCOH minority investor Gamco 
filed suit against iHC, alleging that the transfer constituted a controlling 
shareholder breach of the duty of loyalty to minority shareholders.39  At 
that time, Gamco and its affiliates owned roughly ten percent of outstand-
ing CCOH publicly-offered common stock while iHC owned the remain-
der, hence their status as controller of CCOH.40  
As of the beginning of 2015, CCOH was in a sufficiently strong 
financial situation to contemplate acquisition opportunities.41  By Sep-
tember of that year, CCOH made an about-face and instead decided to 
sell assets.42  The decisions regarding these sales were made at a meeting 
between the iHeart, iHC, and CCOH boards of directors.43  In November, 
CCOH decided to distribute the proceeds from the September asset sales 
as dividends so that iHC could use their portion to bail iHeart out of its 
 
 35. Franklin Advisers, Inc., 2017 WL 4518297, at *4 (“On December 3, 2015, [iHC] 
directed one of its restricted subsidiaries, CC Holdings, to transfer $516 million worth of 
shares of Clear Channel Outdoor Holdings stock to one of [iHC’s] unrestricted subsidiaries, 
Broader Media.”). 
 36. Id.; Gamco Asset Mgmt. Inc., 2016 WL 6892802, at *6–7. 
 37. Franklin Advisers, Inc., 2017 WL 4518297, at *1 (“On March 7, 2016, some of the 
noteholders issued formal notices of default.  On the same day, [iHC] filed the underlying suit 
in which it sought declarations that it had not violated the indentures and was not in default 
on the notes. [iHC] also sought injunctive relief.”). 
 38. Id. (describing the asset transfer); see infra Part III. 
 39. Gamco Asset Mgmt. Inc., 2016 WL 6892802, at *1 (“Gamco filed a Verified Stock-
holder Derivative Complaint . . . against members of the CCOH Board, iHC, an iHC affiliate 
and certain financial sponsors . . . .”). 
 40. Id. at *3 (“Gamco, along with certain of its affiliates, owned 9.9% of the outstanding 
publicly-traded Class-A common stock of CCOH. . . . iHC owns approximately 90% of 
CCOH’s outstanding shares . . . .”). 
 41. Id. at *6 (“[I]n early 2015, CCOH was in an acquisitions mode.  In February and May 
2015, the Board received reports of particular acquisition opportunities in strategic markets, 
such as New York City.”).  
 42. Id. (“By September 2015, in a rather abrupt volte-face, the discussion turned from 
new acquisitions to potential sales of assets.”). 
 43. Id. (“At a joint meeting of the Boards of CCOH and the iHeart Defendants on Sep-
tember 29, 2015, the directors in attendance discussed selling certain CCOH Latin American 
businesses and certain United States assets and considered recommendations regarding the 
retention of financial advisors for the asset sales.”). 
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debt obligations through the end of 2017.44  On December 3, 2015, iHC 
tapped CCOH parent CC Holdings to use The Unrestricted Subsidiary 
Transfer Tactic by initiating the transfer of $516 million worth of CCOH 
stock to iHC’s unrestricted subsidiary Broader Media.45  As a result of 
the transfer, CCOH stock moved from its parent CC Holdings to an ex-
traneous unrestricted subsidiary, meaning that Gamco’s minority shares 
were no longer buttressed by those assets.46   
The transfer of shares to Broader Media was the first step in a 
scheme wherein CCOH made a series of dividend payments.47  The only 
aspect of these payments with importance to this Note is that Broader 
Media received pro rata dividend payments along with all other share-
holders.48  These payments only came in because iHC controlled both CC 
Holdings and Broader Media and orchestrated the transfer of CCOH 
shares from the former to the latter.49  Franklin and Oz believed the stock 
transfer to Broader Media violated certain indenture terms and accord-
ingly constituted an event of default.50  iHC sued Franklin and Oz for a 
declaratory judgment that the transfer did not trigger a default.51  Mean-
while, Gamco believed the dividend payments were an unfair monetary 
boon to iHeart and iHC at minority shareholder expense.52  Gamco sued 
iHeart.53  Both cases were resolved in iHeart’s favor at the trial and ap-
pellate levels.54  
 
 44. Id.  
 45. Franklin Advisers, Inc. v. iHeart Commc’ns Inc., No. 04-16-00532-CV, 2017 WL 
4518297, at *4 (Tex. App. Oct. 11, 2017) (“On December 3, 2015, [iHC] directed one of its 
restricted subsidiaries, CC Holdings, to transfer $516 million worth of shares of Clear Chan-
nel Outdoor Holdings stock to one of [iHC’s] unrestricted subsidiaries, Broader Media.”). 
 46. FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 17; see Gamco Asset Mgmt. Inc., 2016 WL 6892802, at 
*6 (“[Gamco] alleges that in approving the Asset Sales the CCOH Board ‘divested assets at 
suboptimal prices’ on a ‘timetable’ that benefited only the iHeart Defendants.”). 
 47. Gamco Asset Mgmt. Inc., 2016 WL 6892802, at *7.  
 48. Id. at *6. 
 49. Franklin Advisers, Inc., WL 4518297, at *4. 
 50. Id. at *1. 
 51. Id. (“[iHC] filed the underlying suit in which it sought declarations that it had not 
violated the indentures and was not in default on the notes. [iHC] also sought injunctive re-
lief.”). 
 52. Gamco Asset Mgmt. Inc., 2016 WL 6892802, at *7 (describing Gamco’s unjust en-
richment suit against iHeart and iHC). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Gamco Asset Mgmt. v. iHeartMedia Inc., No. 593, 2017 WL 4607413 (Del. Oct. 12, 
2017) (“[W]e affirm largely on the basis of the Court of Chancery’s thorough decision dated 
November 23, 2016.”); Franklin Advisers, Inc., WL 4518297, at *1 (“On appeal, Franklin 
and Oz argue the judgment should be reversed because the trial court erred in construing the 
contracts at issue in this case.  We conclude the trial court did not err, and therefore, affirm 
its judgment.”); Gamco Asset Mgmt. Inc., 2016 WL 6892802, at *2; see also MEYER C. 
278 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 23 
III. UNRESTRICTED SUBSIDIARY TACTIC PROGNOSIS: WHY THESE 
TRANSFERS SEEM, BUT ARE NOT, LEGALLY UNFAIR TO LENDERS AND 
MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS 
A.       Overview of the Perceived Unfairness  
Each of the iHeart actions presents a type of entity positioned to 
feel slighted by controller use of The Unrestricted Subsidiary Transfer 
Tactic.55  The Franklin and Oz suit shows that controllers who pay off 
debts via unrestricted subsidiary transfers risk angering the holders of 
those debts because the move appears to violate the lending covenants.56  
The Gamco suit illustrates that controllers who transfer assets from par-
tially-owned restricted subsidiaries risk angering minority shareholders 
because the tactic appears to violate the controller’s fiduciary duty to 
those minority shareholders.57  However valid these grievances may have 
been, the courts in both cases ruled correctly.58 
B.         Why Unrestricted Subsidiary Transfers Seem, but Are Not,  
Unfair to Lenders 
When it comes to The Unrestricted Subsidiary Transfer Tactic, 
the primary source of tension between controllers like iHC and debt hold-
ers like Franklin and Oz boils down to whether the loan covenants allow 
 
DWORKIN  ET AL., DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP: OPPORTUNITIES AND RISKS IN LIABILITY 
MANAGEMENT TRANSACTIONS AND LOAN DOCUMENTS, at 14 (June 21, 2018), https://www.da-
vispolk.com/files/2018_credit_fund_general_counsel_summit_presentation_materials.pdf 
(“Designating a subsidiary as an unrestricted subsidiary is itself typically considered an in-
vestment.”). 
 55. See Franklin Advisers, Inc., 2017 WL 4518297 (presenting lenders as an aggrieved 
party to the unrestricted subsidiary transfer); Gamco Asset Mgmt. Inc., 2016 WL 6892802 
(presenting minority shareholders of restricted subsidiary CCOH as an aggrieved party to the 
unrestricted subsidiary transfer).   
 56. Franklin Advisers, Inc., 2017 WL 4518297. 
 57. Gamco Asset Mgmt. Inc., 2016 WL 6892802; COX, supra note 1, at 272 (citing Chiles 
v. Robertson, 767 P.2d 903, 912 (Or. Ct. App. 1989)) (“The overall objective of the control-
ling stockholder’s fiduciary obligation is not to bar the controlling stockholder from acting in 
his own self-interest but to assure that when so acting the interests of the corporation are also 
served.”). 
 58. See Franklin Advisers, Inc., 2017 WL 4518297 (presenting lenders as an aggrieved 
party to The Unrestricted Subsidiary Transfer Tactic who sued and lost to the controller); 
Gamco Asset Mgmt. Inc., 2016 WL 6892802 (presenting minority shareholders of restricted 
subsidiary CCOH as an aggrieved party to The Unrestricted Subsidiary Transfer Tactic who 
sued and lost to the controller).   
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for such a move.59  This confusion is justified because loan documents 
have historically allowed controllers to use  unrestricted subsidiaries, al-
beit for a different implied purpose.60  The prior use of unrestricted sub-
sidiaries involved the controller making an off-the-bat designation in the 
covenant package of any subsidiaries that “were not considered part of 
the core credit.”61  The historic manner differs from the current use of 
unrestricted subsidiaries as a way to alleviate loan pressures because it 
required controllers to make upfront statements regarding how they in-
tend to use the subsidiaries.62  Additionally, the upfront subsidiary desig-
nation often entailed controller compliance with certain ratio tests, a re-
quirement that has since fallen out of practice.63  Instead, loans issued to 
controllers, like iHC, have come with carte blanche in that the controller 
can at a later date create unrestricted subsidiaries which will be exempt 
from covenant restrictions.64  Although lenders approved such terms 
while assuming that controllers would not use unrestricted subsidiaries 
for impermissible purposes, the terms themselves did not define which 
purposes were and were not agreeable.65 
Across the historic and current unrestricted uses of unrestricted 
subsidiaries, one key factor has remained constant: the text of loan agree-
ments controls how courts will interpret them, lender assumptions not-
withstanding.66  This jurisprudential axiom was key to the Franklin and 
 
 59. See Franklin Advisers, Inc., 2017 WL 4518297, at *1 (“[iHC] filed the underlying 
suit in which it sought declarations that it had not violated the indentures and was not in de-
fault on the notes. [iHC] also sought injunctive relief.”). 
 60. DWORKIN ET AL., supra note 54, at 15 (describing difference between historic and 
current use of unrestricted subsidiaries). 
 61. DWORKIN ET AL., supra note 54, at 15 (“For example, unrestricted subsidiary capacity 
[would be used for] separating out project or receivables financings and in temporarily hous-
ing the financing for an acquisition prior to consummation (e.g., in an escrow closing struc-
ture).”). 
 62. DWORKIN ET AL., supra note 54, at 15 (“Historically, unrestricted subsidiary capacity 
was intended to allow borrowers to carve out from the covenant and collateral package certain 
subsidiaries and business that were not considered part of the core credit.”). 
 63. DWORKIN ET AL., supra note 54, at 15 (“As these [unrestricted subsidiary designation] 
provisions have evolved, however, restrictions have loosened, so that the typical formulation 
today often does not include a ratio test as a condition to designation, so long as the deemed 
investment in such unrestricted subsidiary would be permitted by the investment covenant.”). 
 64. Franklin Advisers, Inc., 2017 WL 4518297, at *1 (“[T]he indentures allow iHeart to 
create unrestricted subsidiaries that are not subject to the indentures’ restrictive covenants.”). 
 65. DWORKIN ET AL., supra note 54, at 16. 
 66. MARK CHASS & YEKATERINA CHERNYAK, KRAMER LEVIN NAFTALIS & FRANKEL LLP, 
CLIENT ALERT:  IHEART: THE ALCHEMY OF TRANSFERS TO UNRESTRICTED SUBSIDIARIES (Nov. 
17, 2016), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=40ff85f6-6390-48ef-af37-
a20f4ff84e27 (“The basic canon of indenture interpretation is that parties will be held to the 
plain meaning of their documents, and absent ambiguity, courts will not rewrite the parties’ 
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Oz appellate holding on multiple counts, the primary of which was based 
upon how the covenants defined the term “investment.”67  Although 
Franklin and Oz argued that the term “investment” necessarily entailed a 
profit motive, the court concluded that the documents would have in-
cluded the term “profit motive” explicitly in the definition of “invest-
ment” if that were the case.68   
C.         Conflicted Tunneling Transactions and Why Unrestricted    
Subsidiary Transfers Seem Unfair to Minority Shareholders and 
Lenders 
To illustrate why The Unrestricted Subsidiary Transfer Tactic 
tends to create tension between controllers and minority shareholders—
along with exacerbating the controller-lender tensions described 
above69—we must first delve into the closely-related concepts of  “con-
flicted transactions” and “tunneling.”70  In tandem these elucidate why 
minority shareholders like Gamco may feel inclined to sue controllers 
who transfer assets out of their shared business and into an unrestricted 
subsidiary.71  This explanation also serves as a foundation for why those 
controllers are likely to have their suits dismissed, as properly occurred 
in the Gamco suit.72 
Controllers have a fiduciary duty to minority shareholders be-
cause their control entails power to dominate the company.73  A controller 
 
bargain on perceived equitable grounds.”); see Franklin Advisers, Inc., 2017 WL 4518297, at 
*1 (“After reviewing the four corners of the indentures, we conclude that the pertinent lan-
guage in the indentures is not ambiguous.  Additionally, as will be discussed below, we con-
clude that only iHeart’s interpretation of the pertinent language is reasonable.”); DWORKIN ET 
AL, supra note 54, at 16 (June 21, 2018) (“The counterpoint from lenders is that the unre-
stricted subsidiary concept was always intended to serve a legitimate business purpose, not to 
accomplish indirectly what borrowers cannot accomplished directly.”).  
 67. Franklin Advisers, Inc., 2017 WL 4518297, at *4(“[iHC] argues the indentures per-
mitted capital contributions to affiliates without regard to profit motive based on the plain 
language of the definition of ‘Investments’ as ‘all investments in the form of’ ‘capital contri-
butions.’  We conclude this is the only reasonable interpretation of the language in question.”).  
 68. Id. (“Finally, we note that the term ‘profit motive’ never appears in the definition of 
‘Investments’ in the indentures.  If the parties had intended to require a capital contribution 
like the one in this case to have a profit motive, they could have used the term ‘profit motive’ 
in the definition of ‘Investments.’  The parties did not do so.”). 
 69. See supra Part III.B. 
 70. See infra Part III.C. 
 71. See infra Part III.C. 
 72. See infra Part III.C. 
 73. Gamco Asset Mgmt. Inc. v. iHeartMedia Inc., No. 12312, 2016 WL 6892802, at *15 
(Del. Ch. Nov. 23, 2016, revised Nov. 29, 2016) (“It is well-settled that Delaware law imposes 
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has breached their fiduciary duty by engaging in a “conflicted transac-
tion,”74 which is a transaction taken in their capacity as controller that 
benefits themselves but does not benefit the minority shareholders or the 
corporation.75  Therefore, in shareholder derivative suits,76 like the action 
brought by Gamco, the most critical determination is whether or not the 
decision at issue is a conflicted transaction.77  This determination dictates 
the court’s standard of review78 and essentially determines which side 
will win the case.79  A conflicted transaction takes place when the con-
troller has engaged in self-dealing.80  The landmark Sinclair Oil Corp. v. 
 
fiduciary duties on those who effectively control a corporation.”  (internal quotations omit-
ted)), aff’d, No. 593, 2017 WL 4607413 (Del. Oct. 12, 2017); COX, supra note 1, at 272 (“[A] 
controlling stockholder may choose to exercise control to reap disproportionate benefits at the 
expense of the corporation or noncontrolling shareholders such that protection of their interest 
is desirable.  That protection arises by imposing the fiduciary standards on the controlling 
stockholder exercising the controlling influence.”); Sang Yop Kang, Rethinking Self-Dealing 
and the Fairness Standard: A Law and Economics Framework for Internal Transactions in 
Corporate Groups, 11 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 95, 114 (2016)) (“[D]omination over affiliates in 
a corporate group is usually exercised through the affiliates’ board of directors, whom a con-
trolling shareholder selects directly or indirectly through another affiliate that she controls.”  
(citing Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971)). 
 74. E.g., Gamco Asset Mgmt. Inc., 2016 WL 6892802, at *15 (presenting conflicted trans-
actions). 
 75. Id.at *14–19 (“[Gamco] has not alleged facts that meet this high burden because they 
have not pled facts that allow a reasonable inference that the challenged transactions were ‘so 
one sided that no business person of ordinary, sound judgment could conclude that the corpo-
ration has received adequate consideration.’”); COX, supra note 1, at 272 (“The overall objec-
tive of the controlling stockholder’s fiduciary obligation is not to bar the controlling stock-
holder from acting in his own self-interest but to assure that when so acting the interests of 
the corporation are also served.” (citing Chiles v. Robertson, 767 P.2d 903, 912 (Or. Ct. App. 
1989))). 
 76. E.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 35 (Del. 2006) (introduc-
ing a shareholder derivative suit as one which is brought by corporate shareholders on behalf 
of the corporation against the board of directors). 
 77. Gamco Asset Mgmt. Inc., 2016 WL 6892802, at *14–19. 
 78. E.g., id. at *15.  See infra Part III.C. 
 79. COX, supra note 1, at 273 (“It would appear an extremely rare case where the con-
trolling stockholder will be able to establish the transaction’s intrinsic fairness after the court 
has concluded that the same transaction had allowed the controlling stockholder to receive a 
benefit ‘to the exclusion of, and detriment to, the minority stockholders.’” (citing Sinclair Oil 
Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (footnote omitted))). 
 80. Sinclair Oil Corp., 280 A.2d at 720 (“Self-dealing occurs when the parent, by virtue 
of its domination of the subsidiary, causes the subsidiary to act in such a way that the parent 
receives something from the subsidiary to the exclusion of, and detriment to, the minority 
stockholders of the subsidiary.”); In re Straight Path Commc’ns Inc. Consol. Stockholder 
Litig., No. CV 2017-0486-SG, 2018 WL 3120804, at *14 (Del. Ch. June 25, 2018) (describing 
“both sides of the deal” transactions as one of two conflicted transaction types, the second of 
which happens when “the controller does not stand on both sides of the deal but competes 
with minority shareholders for consideration” (internal quotations removed)).  See generally 
In re Crimson Expl. Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. CIV.A. 8541-VCP, 2014 WL 5449419, at 
*12 (Del. Ch. Oct. 24, 2014) (describing “disparate consideration” cases as occurring when 
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Levien definition of self-dealing occurs when the controller receives a 
disproportionately larger amount of consideration from the transaction 
than the minority shareholders receive.81  Self-dealing can also take place 
when money has been shared proportionately between controller and mi-
norities when the context of the transaction indicates the controller 
uniquely benefitted from the transaction in a way the minorities did not.82  
Known as “unique benefit” self-dealing cases, this is the type of self-
dealing Gamco alleged.83   
The most fitting term for the kind of self-dealing that The Unre-
stricted Subsidiary Transfer Tactic resembles is “tunneling.”84  In parent-
subsidiary scenarios, tunneling happens when a controller moves 
 
the controller receives more money for their shares than the minority stockholders receive); 
IRA Tr. FBO Bobbie Ahmed v. Crane, No. CV 12742-CB, 2017 WL 7053964, at *6 (Del. 
Ch. Dec. 11, 2017) (presenting continuing stake conflicted transaction type where “controller 
received, among other consideration, a continuing equity stake in the surviving entity, and the 
minority stockholders received cash” (citing In re John Q. Hammons Hotels Inc. S’holder 
Litig., No. 758-CC, 2009 WL 3165613, at *7–8, 12 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 2009))); In re Straight 
Path Commc’ns Inc. Consol. Stockholder Litig., 2018 WL 3120804, at *15 (finding the oc-
currence of “unique benefit” conflicted transaction type when controlling shareholder indi-
rectly self-dealt by making threats “to withhold support for any sale that would allow [an] 
indemnification claim” to proceed against a company of which his children were ten percent 
shareholders and of which his son was CEO). 
 81. Sinclair Oil Corp., 280 A.2d at 720–22 (“The dividends resulted in great sums of 
money being transferred from Sinven to Sinclair. However, a proportionate share of this 
money was received by the minority shareholders of Sinven.  Sinclair received nothing from 
Sinven to the exclusion of its minority stockholders. As such, these dividends were not self-
dealing.”); In re Crimson Expl. Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. CIV.A. 8541-VCP, 2014 WL 
5449419, at *12 (Del. Ch. Oct. 24, 2014) (labelling disproportionate transactions as “disparate 
consideration” cases). 
 82. In re Straight Path Commc’ns Inc. Consol. Stockholder Litig., 2018 WL at *15; COX 
supra note 1, at 273 (“[E]ven though all stockholders received the same type and amount of 
consideration per share, the controlling stockholder’s significant need for cash was itself a 
unique benefit derived by approving the firm’s sale that it triggered and entire fairness re-
view.” (citing N.J. Carpenters Pension Fund v. infoGROUP, Inc., 2011 WL 4825888 (Del. 
Ch. Oct. 6, 2011))). 
 83. Gamco Asset Mgmt. Inc., 2016 WL 6892802, at *16 (“[Gamco] argues that this is a 
‘unique benefit’ case.  In a ‘unique benefit’ case, ‘the controller receives some sort of special 
benefit not shared with the other stockholders.’  In essence, ‘the controller extracts something 
uniquely valuable to the controller . . . .’” (quoting Crimson, 2014 WL 5449419, at *13) (cit-
ing N.J. Carpenters Pension Fund, 2011 WL 4825888; In re Answers Corp. S’holders Litig., 
C.A. No. 6170-VCN, 2012 WL 1253072, at *1–2, *7 (Del. Ch. Apr. 11, 2012); McMullin v. 
Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 921 (Del. 2000))). 
 84. Simon Johnson et al., Tunneling, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 22, 22 (2000) (“[W]e use the 
term ‘tunneling,’ coined originally to characterize the expropriation of minority shareholders 
in the Czech Republic (as in removing assets through an underground tunnel), to describe the 
transfer of assets and profits out of firms for the benefit of those who control them.”); see 
Gamco Asset Mgmt. Inc., 2016 WL 6892802, at *16 (“[Gamco] has seized upon a line of 
cases in which Delaware courts have applied entire fairness when a controller causes a com-
pany to enter into a transaction for the purpose of addressing an acute liquidity crisis con-
fronting the controller.”). 
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resources out of a subsidiary.85  Controller use of an unrestricted subsid-
iary to evade loan covenants is a form of tunneling.86  Although the con-
cept of tunneling is not widely-known in U.S. corporate law, tunneling is 
a pervasive evil in less-developed national legal systems where control-
lers eviscerate minority interests with impunity.87  Tunneling and The 
Unrestricted Subsidiary Transfer Tactic both entail controllers moving 
resources out of a subsidiary to the detriment of other parties with inter-
ests in that subsidiary; considering the concepts side-by-side underlines 
why The Unrestricted Subsidiary Transfer Tactic makes those it seems to 
hollow-out feel slighted.88  The fact that controllers in both scenarios need 
not fear judgment against them makes for an even better conceptual fit.89  
Tunneling encapsulates unique benefit self-dealing transactions 
wherein the parent drains the subsidiary in order to resolve its own is-
sues.90  One such unique benefit transaction takes place when a parent 
controller moves assets from a subsidiary it controls but does not own in 
full to another subsidiary that it both controls and owns privately in order 
to satisfy a crisis that specifically involves the controller.91  This is 
 
 85. Johnson et al., supra note 84, at 22.   
 86. See Johnson et al., supra note 84, at 22 (“We use the term ‘tunneling’ narrowly to 
refer to the transfer of resources out of a company to its controlling shareholder . . . .”). 
 87. Sang Yop Kang, “Generous Thieves”: The Puzzle of Controlling Shareholder Ar-
rangements in Bad-Law Jurisdictions, 21 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 57, 72 (2015) (“The piracy 
of controlling shareholders is, in practice, a default rule in many bad-law countries.  In other 
words, expropriation of minority shareholders is understood as an “unavoidable tax” imposed 
by corporate bandits.”). 
 88. Franklin Advisers, Inc. v. iHeart Commc’ns Inc., No. 04-16-00532-CV, 2017 WL 
4518297, at *2 (Tex. App. Oct. 11, 2017) (“On appeal, Franklin and Oz argue that the trial 
court erred when it concluded that the stock transfer from CC Holdings to Broader Media was 
permissible under the indentures.”); Gamco Asset Mgmt. Inc., 2016 WL 6892802, at *16; 
Johnson et al, supra note 84, at 22.   
 89. Kang, supra note 73, at 127 (“[It is] difficult, if not impossible, for outsiders (non-
controlling shareholders or law enforcement agencies) to detect [tunneling] and attribute such 
wrongdoing to the controlling shareholder.” (footnotes omitted)); see, e.g., Franklin Advisers, 
Inc., 2017 WL 4518297, at *4 (“[iHC] argues the indentures permitted capital contributions 
to affiliates without regard to profit motive based on the plain language of the definition of 
‘Investments’ as ‘all investments in the form of’ ‘capital contributions.’ We conclude this is 
the only reasonable interpretation of the language in question.”). 
 90. See Gamco Asset Mgmt. Inc., 2016 WL 6892802, at *16 (citing N.J. Carpenters Pen-
sion Fund v. infoGROUP, Inc., 2011 WL 4825888 (Del. Ch. Oct. 6, 2011)) (“[Gamco] argues 
that this is a ‘unique benefit’ case.”); see also Kang, supra note 73, at 105–06 n.39 (“There 
are various forms of tunneling. . . .  [T]unneling covers any type of wealth transfer including, 
but not limited to, ‘asset sales and contracts such as transfer pricing advantageous to the con-
trolling shareholder, excessive executive compensation, loan guarantees, [or] expropriation 
of corporate opportunities.’ ” (first citing Johnson et al., supra note 84, at 22; then quoting 
Johnson et al., supra note 84, at 23) (internal alteration in original))).   
 91. See In re Synthes, Inc. S’holder Litig., 50 A.3d 1022, 1036 (Del. Ch. 2012) (defining 
such a situation as a “fire sale”); Gamco Asset Mgmt. Inc., 2016 WL 6892802, at *16 
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tunneling because the controller gains full control of the asset by grace of 
its full ownership of the company in which the assets reside.92  This com-
plete control can also constitute the basis of a unique benefit the controller 
receives.93  Meanwhile, minority shareholders of the depleted subsidiary 
have lost all stakes they previously had in that asset because they do not 
own any shares of the receiving subsidiary, meaning they do not share in 
the unique benefit.94 
In the iHeart actions, iHC appeared to tunnel CCOH in pursuit of 
a unique benefit by demanding that CC Holdings relinquish CCOH shares 
to iHC’s fully-owned unrestricted subsidiary Broader Media.95  From 
Gamco’s perspective assets that underlaid their CCOH minority shares 
had been tunneled by iHC because the move was a transfer of assets out 
of CCOH that benefitted the controller at Gamco’s expense.96  Because 
unique benefit tunneling transactions were not explicitly and directly per-
mitted by the loan covenants, Franklin and Oz believed them to be im-
permissible.97  
D.        The Business Judgment Rule and Why Tunneling Does Not Have 
to Be Fair 
Grievances of lenders and minority shareholders notwithstand-
ing, The Unrestricted Subsidiary Transfer Tactic is permissible so long 
 
(discussing “unique benefit” cases); see also Kang, supra note 73, at 105–06 n.39 (discussing 
tunneling).   
 92. Kang, supra note 73, at 118 (describing “the controlling shareholder’s personal pay-
off” which is derived from this version of tunneling). 
 93. See Gamco Asset Mgmt. Inc., 2016 WL 6892802, at *16 (citing N.J. Carpenters Pen-
sion Fund, 2011 WL 4825888); see also Kang, supra note 73, at 118 (describing “the con-
trolling shareholder’s personal payoff” which is derived from this version of tunneling). 
 94. Kang, supra note 73, at 118; see Gamco Asset Mgmt. Inc., 2016 WL 6892802, at *16 
(citing N.J. Carpenters Pension Fund, 2011 Del. Ch. WL). 
 95. Kang, supra note 73, at 98–99 (“In the corporate group setting, tunneling often takes 
place via internal transactions among affiliated companies. . . . [A tunneling controller] trans-
fers corporate value to herself. Victims of the internal-transaction tunneling are noncontrol-
ling shareholders of the latter affiliate.”); see Gamco Asset Mgmt. Inc., 2016 WL 6892802, at 
*3 (describing iHC’s use of unrestricted subsidiary Broader Media to tunnel). 
 96. See Gamco Asset Mgmt. Inc., 2016 WL 6892802, at *7 (“[Gamco] alleges that in 
approving the Asset Sales [at the direction of controller iHC] the CCOH Board ‘divested as-
sets at suboptimal prices’ on a ‘timetable’ that benefited only the iHeart Defendants.”). 
 97. See Franklin Advisers, Inc. v. iHeart Commc’ns Inc., No. 04-16-00532-CV, 2017 
WL 4518297, at *2 (Tex. App. Oct. 11, 2017) (presenting lender belief “that the plain lan-
guage of the indentures required the stock transfer at issue in this case to have a ‘profit mo-
tive’” as indicative of their belief that controller use of tunneling, which did not yield profits, 
constituted an event of default). 
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as it does not constitute a breach of the controller’s fiduciary duty to mi-
nority shareholders.98  Without a breach, a tunneling transaction will not 
be considered a conflicted transaction, which means the plaintiffs must 
face the default standard of review in Delaware: the business judgment 
rule.99  On the other hand, conflicted transactions are met with a higher 
judicial standard of review: entire fairness.100  Therefore, tunneling a 
unique benefit from minority shareholders into an unrestricted subsidiary 
does not need to be fair; it just cannot egregiously blare controller disloy-
alty to the point of disregarding the tunneled company.101 
The business judgment rule is a principle of non-review that as-
sumes, pending plaintiff rebuttal, the decisionmakers in question had an 
acceptable basis for initiating the transaction in question.102  Although 
more frequently associated with decisions made by a corporation’s board 
of directors,103 the business judgment rule is also the appropriate standard 
of review for addressing fairness issues in parent-subsidiary shareholder 
contexts because the nuances of structuring intra-family transactions can 
dictate matters such as corporate tax incentives.104  Rebutting the business 
judgment rule is extremely difficult because it places a high burden of 
proof on plaintiff complaints.105  Additionally, the process plaintiffs face 
 
 98. Gamco Asset Mgmt. Inc., 2016 WL 6892802, at *15. 
 99. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (“A parent does indeed 
owe a fiduciary duty to its subsidiary when there are parent-subsidiary dealings.  However, 
this alone will not evoke the intrinsic fairness standard.  This standard will be applied only 
when the fiduciary duty is accompanied by self-dealing . . . .”); Gamco Asset Mgmt. Inc., 2016 
WL 6892802, at *15; Quadrant Structured Prod. Co. v. Vertin, 102 A.3d 155, 183 (Del. Ch. 
2014) (“Delaware’s default standard of review is the business judgment rule . . . .”). 
 100. Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 428 (Del. 1997) (concluding entire fairness 
standard of review to be appropriate due to conflicted transaction determination); see Reis v. 
Hazelett Strip–Casting Corp., 28 A.3d 442, 457 (Del. Ch.2011) (“Delaware has three tiers of 
review for evaluating director decision-making: the business judgment rule, enhanced scru-
tiny, and entire fairness.”). 
 101. See Gamco Asset Mgmt. Inc., 2016 WL 6892802, at *18 (“[Gamco’s fire sale] alle-
gations are undercut by the Board minutes to which [Gamco] has cited which reveal that the 
Board in fact considered and discussed the negative consequences for CCOH should the 
iHeart Defendants be forced into bankruptcy.”). 
 102. In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 56 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“[The business 
judgment rule] reflects and promotes the role of the board of directors as the proper body to 
manage the business and affairs of the corporation.” (internal citations removed).  
 103. Id.  
 104. Sinclair Oil Corp., 280 A.2d at 720 (ruling that the business judgment rule is the 
appropriate default standard of review in addressing issues of fairness in parent-subsidiary 
contexts); COX, supra note 1, at 274 (“The environment of parent-subsidiary corporations is 
rife with instances where for tax or other regulatory purposes the activities of the parent and 
subsidiary may be combined.”). 
 105. Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1092 (Del. 2001). 
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is akin to shooting at an erratically moving target, especially in the case 
of conflicted transactions taking place in parent-subsidiary contexts like 
those involving unrestricted subsidiary transfers.106  Plaintiffs who fail to 
meet this burden are likely to have their complaints dismissed.107 
However, if the plaintiff minority shareholders have alleged that 
the defendant controller engaged in a conflicted transaction, the control-
ler bears the burden of satisfying the judicial scrutiny of the entire fairness 
test.108  The entire fairness standard requires the defendant to meet two 
concurrent requirements: “fair dealing and fair price.”109  Fair dealing 
analysis considers how the deal evolved from a simple idea to a fleshed-
out proposition presented at a meeting.110  When considering fair dealing, 
the defendant controller must assure the court that every phase of the 
transaction was fair.111  Fair price analysis delves into the financial and 
economic situation of the company and of the greater market at the time 
of the transaction.112   
Tunneled minority shareholders would benefit from entire fair-
ness review because furnishing that standard would require the tunneling 
controllers to justify their actions as fair.113  To achieve entire fairness is 
no small task, as the minority must plead facts so compelling that they 
convince the court that—pro rata dividends aside in unique benefit cases 
like that which Gamco alleged114—the controller has been so 
 
 106. COX, supra note 1, at 274. 
 107. E.g. Gamco Asset Mgmt. Inc. v. iHeartMedia Inc., No. 12312, 2016 WL 6892802, at 
*20 (Del. Ch. Nov. 23, 2016, revised Nov. 29, 2016) (“For the foregoing reasons, [Gamco] 
has failed to state viable claims for breach of fiduciary duty . . . . Accordingly, Defendants’ 
Motion to Dismiss the Complaint with prejudice is GRANTED.”), aff’d, No. 593, 2017 WL 
4607413 (Del. Oct. 12, 2017). 
 108. Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 428 (Del. 1997) (“[If the action at issue is a 
conflicted transaction] the conduct of the parties will be viewed under the more exacting 
standard of entire fairness as opposed to the more deferential business judgment standard.”). 
 109. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) (“The concept of fairness 
has two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair price.”). 
 110. Id. (“[Fair dealing] embraces questions of when the transaction was timed, how it was 
initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and how the approvals of the di-
rectors and the stockholders were obtained.”)  
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 44 (“[To satisfy the entire fairness 
standard,] the transaction itself must be objectively fair, independent of the board’s beliefs.” 
(quoting Gesoff v. IIC Insus. Inc., 902 A.2d 1130, 1145 (Del. Ch. 2006))); Kang, supra note 
73, at 105–06 (2016) (describing tunneling as inherently unfair to the tunneled company). 
 114. In re Synthes, Inc. S’holder Litig., 50 A.3d 1022, 1035 (Del. Ch. 2012) (“As a general 
matter, therefore, if one wishes to protect minority stockholders, there is a good deal of utility 
to making sure that when controlling stockholders afford the minority pro rata treatment, they 
know that they have docked within the safe harbor created by the business judgment rule.”); 
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unconscionably disloyal that they have been pre-approved for the VIP 
section of Hell’s Ninth Circle.115  These “very narrow circumstances”116 
compound with the insidious nature of tunneling that allows even the 
worst offenses to remain unnoticed.117  This may be an extremely tough 
pill to swallow for minority shareholders like Gamco and lenders like 
Franklin and Oz, but it should come as no surprise because these com-
plaints against controllers must penetrate a business-friendly doctrine in 
business-friendly jurisdictions like Delaware.118  
IV. IHEART TRANSPLANT: THE LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE 
UNRESTRICTED SUBSIDIARY TRANSFER TACTIC 
A.         Bypassing Litigation with Improved Covenant Drafting and 
 
Gamco Asset Mgmt. Inc. v. iHeartMedia Inc., No. 12312, 2016 WL 6892802, at *16 (citing 
N.J. Carpenters Pension Fund, 2011 Del. Ch.), aff’d, No. 593, 2017 WL 4607413 (Del. Oct. 
12, 2017). 
 115. See In re Synthes, 50 A.3d at 1036.  Then-Chancellor Strine offers the following sce-
nario:  
 
The world is diverse enough that it is conceivable that a mogul who 
needed to address an urgent debt situation at one of his coolest companies 
(say a sports team or entertainment or fashion business), would sell a 
smaller, less sexy, but fully solvent and healthy company in a finger snap 
(say two months) at seventy-five percent of what could be achieved if the 
company sought out a wider variety of possible buyers, gave them time 
to digest non-public information, and put together financing. In that cir-
cumstance, the controller’s personal need for immediate cash to salvage 
control over the financial tool that allows him to hang with stud athletes, 
supermodels, hip hop gods, and other pop culture icons, would have been 
allowed to drive corporate policy at the healthy, boring company and to 
have it be sold at a price less than fair market value, subjecting the mi-
nority to unfairness. 
 
Id.; see also DANTE ALIGHIERI, THE DIVINE COMEDY I: INFERNO 271 (Dorothy L. Sayers trans., 
Penguin Classics 1983) (1320) (“The Ninth Circle is the frozen Lake of Cocytus, which fills 
the bottom of the Pit [which lies at the bottom of Hell], and holds the souls of the Traitors.”). 
 116. Gamco Asset Mgmt. Inc., 2016 WL 6892802, at *17. 
 117. See Kang, supra note 73, at 127 (“[It is] difficult, if not impossible, for outsiders 
(non-controlling shareholders or law enforcement agencies) to detect [tunneling] and attribute 
such wrongdoing to the controlling shareholder.”). 
 118. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (ruling that the busi-
ness judgment rule is the appropriate default standard of review in addressing issues of fair-
ness in parent-subsidiary contexts); see also THOMAS L. HAZEN, JERRY W. MARKHAM & JOHN 
F. COYLE, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES: CASES AND MATERIALS 5–10 
(West Acad., 4th ed. 2016) (describing how states such as Delaware and Nevada which attract 
incorporation within their borders do so by enacting laws which benefit corporate officers and 
directors over minority shareholders). 
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Internal Monitoring  
Lenders with current loan documents that do not explicitly pro-
hibit borrower use of unrestricted subsidiaries to tunnel around covenant 
restrictions are unlikely to prevent tunneling from happening.119  Fortu-
nately, lenders who are now aware of this tactic can draft documents so 
as to protect against the types of tunneling to which they are most vulner-
able.120  This way, the covenant text will ensure wins instead of losses for 
lenders in future suits over unrestricted subsidiary breaches of cove-
nant.121 
Because the transfer of assets to an unrestricted subsidiary can 
result in lawsuits, corporations wishing to avoid suit should demonstrate 
on their own that they have not engaged in a conflicted tunneling trans-
action.122  No case law yet exists with regards to how a corporation should 
cleanse itself when it uses an unrestricted subsidiary in this manner, but 
the Delaware Supreme Court in October, 2018, reaffirmed an internal 
monitoring method that allowed the defendant corporation to rebut appli-
cation of entire fairness review and win the case under the business judg-
ment rule.123  Putting aside the favorable probability of prevailing in 
court, parent companies wishing to both transfer assets to an unrestricted 
subsidiary and avoid tunneling lawsuits would be wise to proactively 
 
 119. See Kang, supra note 73, at 127; supra Part III.B–C. 
 120. See DWORKIN ET AL., supra note 54, at 16 (providing first that “[o]ne way to reduce 
this risk is to permit the distribution from an unrestricted subsidiary solely to the extent the 
assets of such unrestricted subsidiary are not primarily cash,” then offering that “[a]nother 
possibility is to more tightly control investments in unrestricted subsidiaries (e.g., exclude the 
use of the ratio investment basket for such purpose, limit investments to the specific unre-
stricted subsidiary basket and prohibit the investment of IP[)],” then concluding that “a more 
fruitful approach [may] be to add a ratio test on the designation of unrestricted subsidiaries 
that mirrored the RP ratio condition for use of the available amount basket”). 
 121. See Franklin Advisers, Inc. v. iHeart Commc’ns Inc., No. 04-16-00532-CV, 2017 
WL 4518297, at *3 (Tex. App. Oct. 11, 2017) (“After reviewing the four corners of the in-
dentures, we conclude that the pertinent language in the indentures is not ambiguous. Addi-
tionally, . . . we conclude that only iHeart’s interpretation of the pertinent language is reason-
able.”). 
 122. See Gamco Asset Mgmt. Inc. v. iHeartMedia Inc., No. 12312, 2016 WL 6892802 
(Del. Ch. Nov. 23, 2016, revised Nov. 29, 2016) (providing example lawsuit resulting from 
use of Unrestricted Subsidiary Transfer Tactic) aff’d, No. 593, 2017 WL 4607413 (Del. Oct. 
12, 2017); Kang, supra note 73, at 98–99 (describing tunneling). 
 123. See Flood v. Synutra Int’l, 195 A.3d 754, at 756 (Del. 2018) (stating that the business 
judgment rule is satisfied where a controller requires “approval by an independent Special 
Committee and an affirmative vote by a majority of the minority stockholders” as a prerequi-
site to a merger). 
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adopt these controls so as to make themselves less attractive targets to 
litigious minority shareholders like Gamco.124 
The internal monitoring method entails two separate approvals of 
the transaction:  “approval by an independent Special Committee and an 
affirmative vote by a majority of the minority stockholders.”125  Both ap-
provals must be established before the controller begins to flesh-out the 
transaction.126  The special committee should consist of sufficient non-
conflicted attorneys and financial experts to properly evaluate the pro-
posed transaction.127  Upon evaluation, the special committee should ne-
gotiate with the controller as needed to ensure that the transaction is 
fair.128  A minority shareholder wishing to rebut the decisions made by 
the special committee can only do so by alleging that the committee acted 
with gross negligence in approving the transaction.129  Meanwhile, the 
majority vote between the minority shareholders should take place at the 
beginning phase of considering the transaction and before the controller 
and the special committee negotiate as to any transactional details.130  
This order of operations fits snugly with The Unrestricted Subsidiary 
Transfer Tactic because it requires the controller to request permission 
instead of forgiveness from the minority shareholders of the subsidiary.131 
 
 124. Id.; see Allison McNeely, Gabelli Sues Clear Channel Again Over Unpaid iHeart 
Note, BLOOMBERG LAW (Aug. 29, 2018, 2:48 PM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/docu-
ment/PE8K8ASYF01S (referencing the three suits Gamco has filed against iHeart in its ca-
pacity as CCOH minority shareholder). 
 125. Flood, 195 A.3d at 756 (“[W]hat is critical for the application of the business judg-
ment rule is that the controller accept that no transaction goes forward without special com-
mittee and disinterested stockholder approval early in the process and before there has been 
any economic horse trading.”). 
 126. See id. at 762 (“To avoid [the] . . . adverse [scenario of controllers] using a majority-
of-the-minority vote as a chit in economic negotiations with a Special Committee[,] MFW 
reviews transactions under the favorable business judgment rule if ‘these two protections are 
established up-front.’” (quoting In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 528 (Del. Ch. 
2013))). 
 127. Flood, 195 A.3d at 758–59 (detailing the enlistment of the various attorneys, financial 
advisors, bankers, and economic experts that were on the special committee). 
 128. Id. at 759. 
 129. Id. at 756. 
 130. See id. at 763–64 (“[A] controller is required to condition the buyout on both the 
approval of an independent, fully empowered Special Committee and the approval of a ma-
jority of minority stockholders at the beginning stages of the process of considering a going 
private proposal . . . .”). 
 131. See id. (“[W]hat is critical for the application of the business judgment rule is that the 
controller accept that no transaction goes forward without special committee and disinterested 
stockholder approval early in the process and before there has been any economic horse trad-
ing.”); infra Part V. 
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Controllers are not required “to engage in self-sacrifice for the 
benefit of minority shareholders,”132 and this Note does not assert other-
wise.133  However, there exists a legal and moral chasm between control-
lers that “vote their shares in their own interest”134 and those that engage 
in minority shareholder sacrifice for the benefit of themselves.135  Con-
trollers who employ the internal monitoring method recuse themselves, 
thereby rendering the transaction unconflicted because the recusal “self-
disables”136 any temptations to self-deal.137   
B.         Taking the Ongoing Pressures of The Unrestricted Subsidiary 
Transfer Tactic 
The issues which surround the use of The Unrestricted Subsidiary 
Transfer Tactic by troubled companies are expected to continue aris-
ing.138  For example, the bankruptcy proceedings of Claire’s Stores Inc. 
(“Claire’s”) were stymied by creditor Oaktree Capital Group’s com-
plaints that the retailer engaged in the tactic.139  In fact, the complaint 
cited issues pertaining to a dominated committee that could have been 
avoided with the above-discussed independent subcommittee curative 
measures.140  Those issues have since been resolved: Claire’s and Oaktree 
 
 132. In re Synthes, Inc. S’holder Litig., 50 A.3d 1022, 1040 (Del. Ch. 2012). 
 133. See id. at 1040–41(“[T]he duty to put the ‘best interest of the corporation and its 
shareholders’ above ‘any interest . . . not shared by the stockholders generally’ does not mean 
that the controller has to subrogate his own interests so that the minority stockholders can get 
the deal that they want.” (quoting Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 
1993) (footnote omitted))). 
 134. In re Synthes, Inc., 50 A.3d at 1041. 
 135. See id. at 1040–41 (“That is, the duty to put the best interest of the corporation and 
its shareholders above any interest . . . not shared by the stockholders generally does not mean 
that the controller has to subrogate his own interests so that the minority stockholders can get 
the deal that they want.”). 
 136. Flood v. Synutra Int’l, Inc., 195 A.3d 754, 763 (Del. 2018). 
 137. Id. (“[T]he controller [is required] to self-disable before the start of substantive eco-
nomic negotiations, and to have both the controller and Special Committee bargain under the 
pressures exerted on both of them by these protections.”). 
 138. See Orr, supra note 2 (furnishing J. Crew Group Inc. and Claire’s Stores Inc. as two 
current, prime examples of the troubled companies and unrestricted subsidiaries trend). 
 139. Motion of Oaktree Capital Mgmt., L.P. for Entry of an Order Granting Derivative 
Standing and Authority to Prosecute and Settle Claims on Behalf of Certain of the Debtors, 
at 2–3, In re Claire’s Stores, Inc., et al., No. 18-10584 (Bankr. D. Del. filed July 19, 2018). 
 140. See Steven Church, Oaktree Renews Attack on Apollo’s Bankruptcy Deal for 
Claire’s, BLOOMBERG LAW (July 13, 2018, 2:25 PM), https://bnanews.bna.com/bankruptcy-
law/oaktree-renews-attack-on-apollos-bankruptcy-deal-for-claires (“A subcommittee of 
Claire’s board ‘was not an independent committee, was operating under conflict, and did not 
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settled,141 and the bankruptcy case has been closed.142  PetSmart sued loan 
agent Citigroup (who was subsequently replaced by Wilmington Trust as 
loan agent143) for not releasing certain securities of subsidiary Chewy per 
a transfer directed at another private PetSmart subsidiary.144  The loan 
agent did not release these securities because they contend the transfers 
were “designed to impair PetSmart’s existing creditors” and were there-
fore in violation of the lending agreements.145  Additionally, Gamco sued 
iHeart again, this time bringing a class action suit based upon the pro-
gression of the facts stated above which led to iHeart’s bankruptcy filed 
on March 14, 2018.146  However, Gamco will enjoy a more favorable 
outcome this time because the court has approved a settlement of its 
claims as part of approving iHeart’s chapter 11 reorganization plan.147  
 
have the benefit of independent professional advice,’ Oaktree claimed in its filing July 12 in 
U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Wilmington, Del.”); supra Part IV.A. 
 141. Order (I) Confirming Third Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Claire’s Stores, Inc. 
and its Debtor Affiliates and (II) Granting Related Relief, at 6 ¶ 15, 7 ¶ 17, In re Claire’s 
Stores, Inc., et al., No. 18-10584 (Bankr. D. Del. filed July 19, 2018). 
 142. See Final Decree (I) Closing the Subsidiary Cases and (II) Granting Related Relief, 
In re Claire’s Stores, Inc., et al., No. 18-10584 (Bankr. D. Del. filed July 19, 2018) (granting 
relief in all related cases). 
 143. Katherine Doherty & Eliza Ronalds-Hannon, Wilmington Trust Is Said to Replace 





 144. Complaint at 1, Argos Holdings, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., No. 1:18-cv-05773 (S.D.N.Y. 
filed June 26, 2018) (“This action is necessary because [Citibank] is refusing to fulfill its clear 
and explicit obligations, as Agent under the Credit Agreement, arising from two transactions 
executed by PetSmart and Argos Holdings on June 1, 2018 . . . .”); Ronalds-Hannon supra 
note 24 (describing the Chewy.com transfer). 
 145. Second Amended Counterclaims at 4–5, Argos Holdings, Inc. v. Wilmington Tr., 
N.A., No. 1:18-cv-05773 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 15, 2018). 
 146. See Verified Class Action Complaint at 11, Gamco Asset Mgmt. Inc. v. Blair Hen-
drix, et al., No. 2018-0633 (Del. Ch. filed Aug. 27, 2018) (“Instead of employing the forego-
ing options that would have protected Minority Shareholders of Clear Channel . . . [defend-
ants] decided to follow the years-long pattern of elevating the interests of the iHeart Entities, 
and by extension the Private Equity Defendants, above those of Minority Shareholders.”); see 
also McNeely, supra note 124 (“Mario Gabelli’s Gamco Asset Management Inc. files another 
lawsuit on behalf of Clear Channel Outdoor Holdings Inc. minority shareholders for breaches 
of fiduciary duty by the company’s board of directors and the intercompany note commit-
tee.”); supra parts II–III. 
 147. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Confirming the Modified Fifth 
Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of iHeartMedia, Inc. and its Debtor Affil-
iates Pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code ¶ 93, at 43, In re iHeartMedia, Inc., et 
al., No. 18-31274 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 2019) (“The CCOH Separation Settlement 
Agreement provided the Debtors with full releases of all claims, objections and all other 
causes of action that have been asserted, could have been asserted, or could ever be asserted 
by or on behalf of CCOH [or Gamco] . . . .”); see also Steven Church, iHeartMedia Wins 
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One element of the plan: iHeart will cease using The Unrestricted Sub-
sidiary Transfer Tactic.148   
V. CONCLUSION 
The previously discussed rash of proceedings is not surprising,149 
and these lawsuits foreshadow that more like them are to be expected.150  
As the law is currently structured, businesses like iHeart are within their 
rights to use The Unrestricted Subsidiary Transfer Tactic in order to skirt 
debts.151  Fortunately, minority shareholder response may prod control-
lers that contemplate using their unrestricted subsidiaries accordingly to 
first employ one or both approval methods of Flood v. Synutra Interna-
tional in order to avoid lawsuits.152  There is no dispute that the optics of 
The Unrestricted Subsidiary Transfer Tactic are bad, likely because the 
tactic seems similar to embezzlement.153  Controllers who use the Flood 
approval methods before entering transactions that involve transferring 
 
Initial Approval to Settle Clear Channel Suit, BLOOMBERG LAW (Dec. 17, 2018, 5:39 PM), 
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bankruptcy-law/iheartmedia-wins-initial-approval-to-settle-
clear-channel-suit-1 (noting that Gamco Asset Mgmt. v. Blair Hendrix, et al., No. 2018-0633 
was filed pursuant to the In re iHeartMedia, Inc., bankruptcy proceeding). 
 148. See Soma Biswas, Judge Gives iHeartMedia the Green Light to Exit Bankruptcy, 
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 22, 2019, 6:29 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/judge-gives-iheartmedia-
the-green-light-to-exit-bankruptcy-11548199748 (“iHeart owns most of Clear Channel and 
for years has had an arrangement that allowed it to take cash from the billboard company’s 
bank accounts . . . . The practice will end once Clear Channel breaks away from iHeart . . . 
.”). 
 149. See supra Part IV.B. 
 150. See Order (I) Confirming Third Amended Joint Chapter 11 Plan of Claire’s Stores, 
Inc. and its Debtor Affiliates and (II) Granting Related Relief, 6–7, In re Claire’s Stores, Inc., 
et al., No. 18-10584 (Bankr. D. Del. filed July 19, 2018) (Claire’s litigation flowing from use 
of unrestricted subsidiary to tunnel); Complaint, Argos Holdings, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., No. 
1:18-cv-05773 (S.D.N.Y. filed June 26, 2018) (PetSmart litigation flowing from use of unre-
stricted subsidiary to tunnel); McNeely, supra note 124 (third lawsuit filed by Gamco against 
iHeart for The Unrestricted Subsidiary Transfer Tactic). 
 151. See Eaton Vance Mgmt. v. Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc., 2018 N.Y. Slip Op. 30727(U) 
(Trial Order), FSB, No. 654397, 2018 WL 1947405 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 25, 2018) (holding 
that minority owner plaintiffs could not bring suit against J. Crew for using The Unrestricted 
Subsidiary Transfer Tactic due to no-action clause which only allowed such actions to be 
brought by a majority of shareholders); see also FRIEDMAN ET AL., supra note 17 (“Companies 
may use unrestricted subsidiaries in order to . . . [facilitate] exchange[s] that would otherwise 
not be permitted by the financing agreement’s covenants.”). 
 152. See supra Part III-IV. 
 153. See Kang, supra note 73, at 126 (“Whether corporate value is transferred via an in-
ternal transaction or outright theft, the negative effect on public shareholders’ payoff is basi-
cally the same in the sense that public shareholders lose a part of corporate wealth that should 
belong to them: embezzlement of $100 is functionally equivalent to internal-transaction tun-
neling when a controlling shareholder ends up with a $100 benefit (thus resulting in a $100 
loss of corporate funds).”); see also supra Part IV.B. 
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assets to unrestricted subsidiaries will look less like embezzlers, an ap-
proach that will not go unnoticed by creditors.154  Although creditors cer-
tainly do not expect guarantees when investing, they also do not expect 
to feel taken advantage of by their fiduciaries.155  Parent companies that 
monitor their transactions will reassure investors in their subsidiaries that 
they will live up to their fiduciary duties in troubled times.156  Meanwhile, 
companies expecting lenders and minority shareholders to remain loyal 
after surprising them with The Unrestricted Subsidiary Transfer Tactic 





 154. See Flood v. Synutra Int’l, 195 A.3d 754, 756 (Del. 2018); see also Kang, supra note 
73, at 126 (comparing tunneling to embezzlement). 
 155. See Gamco Asset Mgmt. Inc. v. iHeartMedia Inc., No. 12312, 2016 WL 6892802, at 
*12 (Del. Ch. Nov. 23, 2016, revised Nov. 29, 2016) (“[I]t is not contested that [iHeart and 
iHC] owe fiduciary duties to the [Gamco] stockholders by virtue of their position as control-
lers of CCOH.”), aff’d, No. 593, 2017 WL 4607413 (Del. Oct. 12, 2017); see also Sang Yop 
Kang, “Generous Thieves”: The Puzzle of Controlling Shareholder Arrangements in Bad-
Law Jurisdictions, 21 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 57, 72 (2015) (“[M]inority shareholders in 
[United States jurisdictions] are generally insulated from large-scale expropriation by corpo-
rate insiders.”). 
 156. See supra Part IV.A. 
 157. See Verified Class Action Complaint at *2–3, Gamco Asset Mgmt. Inc. v. Blair Hen-
drix, No. 2018-0633 (Del. Ch. filed Aug. 27, 2018) (“[As bankruptcy loomed, the] Defendants 
did nothing, choosing to fiddle while Rome burned. By doing nothing, these Defendants con-
tinued to favor the increasingly unsalvageable interests of the iHeart Entities . . . in breach of 
their fiduciary duties to Minority Shareholders . . . .”). 
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